The Security Brief · Sep 15, 2026

The Security Brief: AI-written emails posing as CEOs are being used to steal invoice payments, and 2 more

One item is critical: AI is making fake payment requests from executives convincing enough to pass, so check that no payment is approved on an email alone. Two more matter if you buy AI access through resellers or rely on a licensed AI model.

AI-written emails posing as CEOs are being used to steal invoice payments

Critical
What happened
Microsoft reported attackers using AI to impersonate chief executives and send fake payment requests, with losses in the cases it described of nearly $50,000. (Microsoft Security Blog, Sep 10)
What it means for you
AI makes a fake request from your CEO read exactly like the real thing, so an email that looks right is no longer proof. Any payment approved by email alone is exposed.
What to do
Ask your CFO or controller whether every payment request is confirmed by a call to a number already on file before money moves.
Read more

Business email compromise, where an attacker poses as an executive to get a payment approved, has existed for years. Microsoft's report describes attackers now using AI to copy an executive's writing style and, in some cases, voice, which makes the request more convincing and lowers the skill needed to run the fraud. The cases Microsoft described involved losses of nearly $50,000. The practical defense is not better email filtering but a payment rule that does not depend on the email: confirming every payment request through a separate channel, such as a call to a known number.

Confirmed

  • Microsoft reported a campaign using AI to impersonate chief executives in payment requests.
  • Losses in the cases described totaled nearly $50,000.

Not confirmed

  • How widespread the campaign is beyond the cases Microsoft described.

Who is affected

Any company that approves payments on the strength of an email or message from an executive.

For your security team

AI-assisted business email compromise (BEC) using generated executive voice and writing style. Review payment authorization controls, specifically out-of-band confirmation requirements, under the assumption that written communication can be indistinguishable from the executive's own. Microsoft's post includes its detection and mitigation guidance.

An attacker used an AI agent to steal and resell access to AI services

Important
What happened
SANS researchers described an attacker using a partly self-directed AI agent to break into services that resell access to AI models, then take and resell that access without permission. (SANS Internet Storm Center, Sep 11)
What it means for you
If your company buys AI through a reseller or a service that pools access to several AI models to save cost, that service is the kind this attack went after, and your access and data could pass through it.
What to do
Ask your IT lead whether you buy AI access through a reseller or pooling service, and who has checked its security.
Read more

The SANS account describes an AI agent acting with stolen credentials, making its own decisions and widening its own access, without a person approving each step. It exploited weaknesses in services that resell access to AI models and used them to build a chain of stolen access that it then offered to others. The lesson for business leaders is less about the AI tools themselves than about the connections between services: who can use your company's access, and who reviews those connections.

Confirmed

  • SANS published an account of an attacker using a semi-autonomous AI agent against AI resale services.

Not confirmed

  • How many companies' access was taken.
  • Which resale services were affected.

Who is affected

Companies that buy AI model access through resellers or services that combine several AI providers.

For your security team

Semi-autonomous agent exploiting vulnerabilities in LLM resale and API aggregation gateways to harvest and re-serve inference access (a self-expanding stolen inference supply chain). Review identity and access controls on third-party LLM gateways and API aggregators, credential scope and rotation, and usage anomalies.

US agencies confirm Chinese AI firms are copying US AI models at scale

Important
What happened
CISA, the NSA and the FBI confirmed that China-based AI companies are running large-scale campaigns to extract what US AI models can do, to speed up their own development. (CISA, Sep 8)
What it means for you
The target is the AI model itself, not your data. If your company relies on a licensed AI model for a competitive edge, that edge could shrink without any breach of your own systems.
What to do
Ask your general counsel or head of technology whether your AI vendors' terms say how they report this kind of risk to customers.
Read more

The joint advisory describes what it calls industrial-scale knowledge distillation: querying a model systematically to reproduce its abilities in another model. The risk is to the intellectual property built into US AI models. For most companies that use AI rather than build it, nothing is stolen from them directly, but any advantage that comes from using a particular licensed model may narrow. Boards overseeing technology assets can ask whether AI vendors disclose this risk in their terms or incident reporting.

Confirmed

  • CISA, NSA and FBI jointly warned of China-based AI companies running distillation campaigns against US models.

Not confirmed

  • Which specific models or vendors were targeted.
  • Any effect on customers' own data.

Who is affected

AI model developers directly; companies whose competitive position depends on a licensed AI model, indirectly.

For your security team

Industrial-scale knowledge distillation: systematic extraction of model functionality through queries. Relevant to organizations that develop, fine-tune or host models: review API rate limiting, abuse detection and output monitoring. See the joint CISA, NSA and FBI advisory.

The number

100,000 emails in a single day

Emails sent in one campaign targeting organizations to steal personal and financial information, as measured in a single observed campaign. Microsoft Security Blog, Sep 10, 2026

A question for your security lead

For each AI agent or copilot tool currently running in our environment with access to internal systems or external APIs, do we have a documented inventory of what credentials it holds, what actions it is authorized to take, and who reviews its activity logs?